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ABSTRACT 
Is Retest Bias Biased? An Examination of Race, Sex, and Ability 
Differences in Retest Performance on the Wonderlic Personnel Test 
by 
Jason Gilbert Randall 
Research suggests there may be race, sex, and ability differences in score 
improvement on different selection tests and methods when retested (Schleicher, Van 
Iddekinge, Morgeson, & Campion, 2010). However, it is uncertain what individual 
differences moderate retest performance on GMA assessments, and why. In this 
study, 243 participants were retested on the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT). There 
was no evidence that race, sex, emotional stability, or conscientiousness moderate 
retest performance on the WPT, although SAT scores did positively predict retest 
performance. Individuals within the interquartile range of the initial WPT scores 
gained more when retested than those with more extreme scores. Establishing 
artificial cut-off levels demonstrated that those below the cut-off gained more when 
retested than those above the cut-off. Therefore, average-scorers and in some cases 
lower-scorers who may have failed to meet a predetermined cut-off are encouraged to 
re-test as they have little to lose and much to gain. 
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Is Retest Bias Biased? An Examination of Race, Sex, and Ability 
Differences in Retest Performance on the Wonderlic Personnel Test 
High-stakes testing is pervasive in today’s society and numerous important, 
potentially life-changing decisions are made based on the outcomes of such tests. Thus, it 
is inevitable that people will seek opportunities to retest as a way to re-prove or improve 
their scores. Additionally, because no test is error free and many factors may contribute 
to an individual underperforming, the practice of retesting is common in both academic 
and employment settings (Lievens, Reeve, & Heggestad, 2007; Hausknecht, Halpert, Di 
Paolo, & Gerrard, 2007). Re-taking cognitive ability tests in educational and 
organizational settings is very common, with as many as 25%-50% of applicants being 
retested (Hausknecht et al., 2007). Applicants retest for various reasons, which may 
reflect applicants’ desire to improve their chances of qualifying for educational and 
occupational opportunities (Hausknecht et al., 2007), or alternatively an organization’s 
suggestion or protocol for retesting (Tippins et al., 2006). The opportunity for retesting in 
selection and promotion decisions is sanctioned and even encouraged by both the Society 
for Industrial Organizational Psychology (2003) and the American Psychological 
Association (1999) as a way to control for measurement error and as a chance for 
individuals to improve their scores. Yet, despite the advantages and frequency of 
retesting, there is ample evidence to suggest that retesting inflates assessments of ability 
up to about one quarter of a standard deviation between the first and second 
administration (Hausknecht et al., 2007). Drawing on substantial evidence of adverse 
impact for cognitive ability assessments and preliminary evidence of subgroup 
differences for retest effects, in this study I investigated whether differences in retest 
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gains on ability assessments could be explained by various psychological phenomena 
associated with race and sex. I also examined how variation in ability-level affects the 
magnitude of retest gains and consider how these differences may impact selection 
procedures via the creation of artificial cut-off scores. 
In an attempt to document and diagnose the existence and extent of retest effects, 
researchers have investigated a myriad of tests in educational and employment settings, 
as well as in research laboratories. A recent meta-analysis found no difference in retest 
effects between operational settings (i.e., educational and employment) and research or 
lab settings (Hausknecht et al., 2007). However, there are likely differences in the 
motivations for and allowances to retest between educational and employment settings, as 
well as differences in test content and the underlying constructs the tests are designed to 
assess. Interestingly, research suggests that despite its conceptual design (achievement vs. 
aptitude) or the setting in which a GMA assessment is used (employment, education, 
laboratory), cognitive ability assessments (e.g., SAT, GATB, Wonderlic, Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices) are susceptible to coaching and retest bias (Reeve & Lam, 2005; 
Kulik, Kulik, & Bangert, 1984; Hausknecht et al., 2007). This study focuses on retest 
effects for an assessment of GMA that is often used in employment settings: the 
Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT). 
Retest Bias 
The phenomenon of retest bias—consistent score increases across repeat 
administrations of the same test—is a well-established finding in many fields and for 
many types of assessments (Hausknecht et al., 2007; Kulik et al., 1984). For example, 
retest effects (also called testing effects) are extensively studied in the experimental and 
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educational psychology literatures. In these domains, most research on testing effects 
utilizes tests of free recall (or other memory tests) or multiple-choice tests to demonstrate 
how multiple administrations of a test affect subsequent performance and learning 
(Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). The common finding is that merely having taken a test 
previously contributes to improved test performance on subsequent assessments 
(Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). Such performance improvements may be attributable to 
various factors including the learning of test content or even familiarization of test format 
and strategy. Lievens, Reeve, and Heggestad (2007) succinctly classified the underlying 
rationale explaining the mechanisms of retest bias into three categories: 1) actual 
increases in the target ability, 2) a reduction in measurement error and debilitating 
factors, and 3) increases in test-specific, non-g skills. The first two categories are the 
reason the Society for Industrial Organizational Psychology (2003) and the American 
Psychological Association (1999) have cited as rationale for allowing applicants to re-
take assessments in selection and promotion contexts, while the third is typically the 
rationale identified in the research as accounting for the retest phenomenon (Lievens et 
al., 2007; Hausknecht et al., 2007; Lievens et al., 2005; Kulik et al., 1984). This is 
especially true for retesting with cognitive ability assessments in which the target 
construct, GMA, is conceptualized as a stable psychological construct and thus extra 
practice or coaching designed to increase ability should do nothing to account for typical 
score increases seen at subsequent administrations (Reeve & Lam, 2005). 
Retest Effects for Cognitive Ability Assessments 
Cognitive ability is generally the most valid predictor of job performance across job 
categories (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Due to the predictive power and common use of 
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cognitive ability assessments, it is no surprise that there are also high rates of retesting 
with ability tests reported in studies examining employment retesting (Hausknecht et al., 
2007; Lievens et al., 2005; Schleicher et al., 2010). Reeve and Lam (2005) addressed the 
paradox that retest effects for cognitive ability introduce. If it is possible and common to 
see score gains on measures of GMA, one must either question the conceptualization of 
ability as a stable construct, or the assumption of measurement invariance (that the 
relationship between GMA and test indicators remains stable), the latter of which would 
undoubtedly undermine the inferences drawn from test scores. After administering a 
general cognitive ability test several times to group of participants, Reeve and Lam 
(2005) found that mere retesting did not alter the latent construct (GMA) being measured 
as the reliability of factor scores and construct validity of the test remain the same when 
retested. Yet despite the stability of the construct and its psychometric properties in retest 
situations, these authors still saw sizable score increases typical of the retest 
phenomenon, with some scales approaching a one standard deviation increase. Thus, 
Reeve and Lam (2005) concluded that the retest phenomenon for assessments of 
cognitive ability are likely attributed to non-cognitive, test-specific or non-g factors 
associated with practice—a conclusion that has since been substantiated (Lievens et al., 
2007; te Nijenhuis, van Vianen, & van der Flier, 2007).  
In a recent meta-analysis, Hausknecht and colleagues (2007) evaluated 107 samples 
where participants took a cognitive ability assessment at least twice. These authors found 
an overall score inflation of about one quarter of a standard deviation (δ = 0.26) between 
the first and second administration, with the increase dropping to 0.18 between second 
and third administrations. In their evaluations of moderators, Hausknecht et al. (2007) 
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found that retest score increases were positively related to time spent receiving formal 
test coaching, that the magnitude was greater for identical than for alternate forms, that 
larger increases were associated with shorter time periods between administration, and 
that the increase was attributable to factors other than regression to the mean alone. 
Contrary to their expectations, however, retest bias was not related to participant time in 
formal schooling or study context (operational selection vs. research setting), and did not 
differ by dimension of ability (analytical, quantitative, and verbal). These data present 
fairly conclusive evidence that retest bias is a real issue for ability assessments.  
However, while many moderators were examined in this meta-analysis, there is an 
obvious emphasis on methodological factors as explanations for the retest phenomenon. 
Thus, while time between retest, test form, study context, coaching, and dimension of 
ability were all considered in this review, other individual differences such as race, sex, 
and ability level which may also moderate the magnitude of the retest phenomenon were 
not considered. This is especially problematic in selection contexts because in addition to 
issues of retest bias, one must also consider issues of adverse impact when using 
cognitive ability assessments. As a result, it is imperative to determine whether certain 
individuals gain more from retesting than others, or whether the mere act of re-
administering a GMA assessment unfairly disadvantages certain subgroups. To address 
this gap in the literature, in the current study I addressed two areas of concern: subgroup 
(race and sex) differences, and ability differences. 
Subgroup Differences for Cognitive Ability Assessments 
Group differences on selection tests have long been an important concern in 
industrial/organizational psychology, and much of this preoccupation has to do with laws 
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and sanctions enacted to promote equal employment opportunity. Adverse impact is 
characterized by differential hiring rates for different groups (e.g., race, sex, age) because 
of mean group differences on selection tests (Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001). There is 
a wealth of evidence to show that group differences on cognitive ability tests do exist and 
that these tests demonstrate higher rates of adverse impact than do other selection tests 
such as personality measures (e.g., Hattrup, Rock, & Scalia, 1997; Hough et al., 2001; 
Sackett, Schmitt, Ellingson, & Kabin, 2001). Organizations are often torn between using 
selection tests that produce scores demonstrating the highest validity (cognitive ability 
assessments) but also result in adverse impact, or sacrificing validity for selection 
measures that are more likely to result in a diverse workforce (De Corte, Lievens, & 
Sackett, 2007; Pyburn, Ployhart, & Kravitz, 2008). This perplexing problem has been 
termed the “diversity-validity dilemma” (Pyburn et al., 2008, 144) and the “selection 
quality-adverse impact problem” (De Corte et al., 2007, 1380). 
To assess the extent to which mean differences in cognitive ability tests differ by 
race, Roth, Bevier, Bobko, Switzer, and Tyler (2001) meta-analyzed differences between 
Black-Americans and White-Americans on cognitive ability tests and found that Whites 
outperformed Blacks overall by an average of one standard deviation for job applicants in 
employment settings on general intelligence measures. These authors also identified two 
important moderators: job complexity, such that the difference is more exaggerated for 
jobs of low complexity (.86) than those of high complexity (.63); and study design, such 
that the difference is more exaggerated for job applicants in cross-job study designs (1.0-
1.23) than for within-job designs (.83). Research has determined that differences between 
Blacks and Whites on ability assessments are not due to changes in the underlying factor 
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structure (Jensen, 1980; Carretta & Ree, 1995), mirroring the more general finding that 
retesting does not change the factor structure of ability assessments (Reeve & Lam, 
2005). Thus, it would appear that neither race differences nor retest bias can be explained 
by a distortion of the structure of the GMA construct. 
Mean group score differences on general ability assessments by sex, however, are 
much lower than race differences. In fact, most GMA tests are designed so that there are 
no differences between male and female mean scores; thus if differences are found on 
GMA they are of small effect and are not in a consistent direction (Neisser et al., 1996). 
Subgroup Differences in Retesting 
Recognizing that adverse impact is a common and genuine problem when 
cognitive ability tests are used in employment selection contexts, one might ask whether 
retesting ameliorates or exaggerates pre-existing subgroup differences on such tests. 
Examinations of subgroup differences and retesting suggest that there are race, sex, and 
age differences on retest gains for varying selection tools. Examining retest scores of 
applicants for government jobs who re-took tests one year or more after an unsuccessful 
initial attempt, Schleicher et al. (2010) found significantly different average magnitudes 
of improvement upon retesting by race for only certain types of selection measures. The 
differential improvement of Whites over Hispanics and Blacks upon retesting was 
significant on what the authors classified as written tests: job knowledge, biodata, and 
verbal ability. No retest differences by race were found for performance-based ability 
tests: three types of interviews, a leaderless group discussion, and a case analysis 
exercise. In contrast, Blacks generally showed greater improvement than Whites when re-
interviewing. Concerning sex and age, the authors found that women and applicants 
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under 40 showed larger improvements with retesting than did men and applicants over 
40. Specifically, there were no differences by sex on the written tests, but women 
improved more than men on all of the performance tests. Van Iddekinge et al. (2011) 
found no significant differences by race (Black-White, Hispanic-White, or Asian-White) 
on retesting scores for a job knowledge test. The authors did, however, find that females 
improved more than males, and that younger candidates improved more than older 
candidates. 
In summary, there is evidence for subgroup differences when retesting in 
operational settings for different constructs (job knowledge, verbal ability) and methods 
(biodata, interviewing, assessment center exercises; Schleicher et al., 2010; Van 
Iddekinge et al., 2011; Lievens et al., 2005). However, the evidence of subgroup 
differences for retesting with assessments of general cognitive ability (GMA) is not well 
established. 
Initial evidence suggests that Whites improve more in a retest setting for written 
assessments of verbal ability than do Blacks, Hispanics, or Asians. Schleicher and 
colleagues (2010) expected to see this pattern of results since they argued that adverse 
impact is most common when assessments of knowledge, skills, and abilities are far 
removed from actual performance (i.e., written or tested on paper instead of performed in 
person). Schleicher et al. (2010) found no difference on the verbal ability assessment 
between men and women, but again found a significant difference in the improvement of 
people under 40 when compared to re-testers over 40. However, their assessment of 
verbal ability was designed to measure grammar, spelling, punctuation, word use, and 
organization required for writing and editing (2010). Such a test is clearly different from 
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typical assessments of GMA (e.g., WPT, SAT, APM) which are designed to assess more 
than just writing and editing knowledge and capability. Thus, it remains to be seen 
whether there are subgroup differences on retest scores for general cognitive ability 
assessments. 
Ability differences in Retesting 
Investigations of differences among re-testers have also demonstrated that 
individuals retested on a number of ability assessments show larger improvements in 
those with higher initial ability than those with lower ability (Rapport et al., 1997; 
Salthouse & Tucker-Drob, 2008), including aptitude and achievement tests (Kulik et al., 
1984). For example, in their meta-analysis, Kulik and colleagues (1984) categorized 
studies as comprising low-, middle-, or high-ability samples and computed the difference 
scores for each group to determine whether retest magnitude differed by ability group. 
These authors found effect sizes (Cohen’s d) characterizing score increases from time one 
to time two of .17 for students of low ability, .40 for students of middle ability, and .82 
for students of high ability. Rapport and colleagues (1997) similarly divided individuals 
into groups of low-, average-, and high-average intelligence based on initial scores on the 
WAIS-R and found that average- and high-average groups improved more from time one 
to time two than did the low-average group, though their sample was small (n = 12 in 
each group; N = 36). These two studies offer important evidence that cognitive ability 
moderates the increase of retest gains, with higher-scoring individuals gaining more from 
retesting than lower-scoring individuals. However, this evidence was accumulated by 
categorizing or segmenting individuals into discrete levels of ability and comparing 
means of these artificial groups. I hope to build on this previous work by considering 
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GMA as a continuous variable in order to make a more definitive conclusion concerning 
potential for ability-level to moderate retest effects. 
Underlying Mechanisms 
There are a number of possible mechanisms that may contribute to an explanation 
of why differences in cognitive ability, sex, and race arise when re-taking cognitive 
ability assessments. Most explanations for retest differences can be classified as 1) 
ability-based, 2) personality-based, 3) attitude-based, or 4) motivation-based. 
Examination of each of these factors is critical, yet beyond the scope of the current 
research. Thus, in the current study I focus only on ability- and personality-based 
mechanisms, recognizing that investigation of attitude- and motivation-based 
mechanisms are an important and necessary extension for future research. 
There are several reasons why individuals of different races might improve 
differentially from a retest opportunity which, beyond factors such as stereotype threat 
and test-taking attitudes, are mostly ability-based. Ability-based mechanisms are not a far 
step from the finding that those who score higher on cognitive ability tests gain more 
from retesting than do those who score lower on such tests (Rapport et al., 1997; Kulik et 
al., 1984; Salthouse & Tucker-Drob, 2008). This connection hinges on earlier research 
showing that Whites generally outperform Black and Hispanic minorities on measures of 
GMA (Roth et al., 2001; Chan & Schmitt, 1997). Logically, if Whites score higher on 
cognitive ability tests and those who score higher on such tests the first time gain more 
from retesting than those who score lower, then it may be expected that Whites may gain 
more from retesting than Blacks or Hispanics. 
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The mechanisms I chose to focus on for sex differences are captured by two key 
personality variables: emotional stability and conscientiousness. First, research has found 
a consistent negative relationship between emotional stability and test anxiety (e.g., 
Schmidt & Riniolo, 1999), with test anxiety mediating the positive relationship between 
emotional stability and performance on intelligence tests (Moutafi, Furnham, & Tsaousis, 
2006). Moreover, Dobson (2000) found that performance on cognitive tests is 
underestimated for individuals low on emotional stability, even in real selection 
situations. Thus, women, who typically score lower on emotional stability than men 
(Schmitt, Realo, Voracek, & Allik, 2008), may be more negatively affected by test 
anxiety and thus perform worse on the WPT at the initial assessment. However, to the 
extent that the first administration in a retest paradigm represents the most anxiety-
inducing situation where the test and setting are new to the test-taker, the retest 
opportunity should be marked by lower levels of anxiety, thus the negative effects of test 
anxiety (i.e., the positive effects of higher emotional stability) should be attenuated upon 
retesting, resulting in larger gains for women. Second, people high in conscientiousness 
who are more detail-oriented and achievement-striving may be better at remembering 
specific test content and forming effective test-taking strategies, which would also aid 
retest performance. Evidence also shows that individuals high in conscientiousness are 
more likely to set their own performance goals and to engage in processes to maintain the 
motivation and effort necessary to attain these self-set goals (Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 
1993). Women also report higher mean levels of conscientiousness than men do (Schmitt 
et al., 2008), so this difference may also contribute to women’s differential retest 
improvement. 
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Finally, there are at least two reasons why higher-ability individuals should gain 
more from retesting than lower-ability individuals: memory and test-wiseness. Lievens, 
Reeve, and Heggestad (2007) found that memory correlated significantly with retest 
gains, suggesting it may account in part for score increases upon retesting. There is also 
some preliminary evidence that certain types of memory, a lower-order dimension of 
cognitive ability, may differ by race and sex (Hough et al., 2001). Verive and McDaniel 
(1996) meta-analyzed race differences on memory-span tests and saw that Whites out-
performed Blacks by about one half of a standard deviation. Concerning sex differences, 
Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) found that women out-performed men on memory tests 
containing verbal content, but that differences were much smaller on memory tests of 
objects and digits. Test-wiseness has typically been characterized as test-specific non-g 
skills which enable an individual to improve their score on a test upon re-administration 
of a test (Lievens et al., 2007; Te Nijenhuis, van Vianen, & van der Flier, 2007). 
Although the definition of test-wiseness precludes the impact of GMA as the source for 
the retest gains (i.e., non-g skills), it may be that, similar to the effect of cognitive ability 
on performance and learning, people who score higher on GMA assessments acquire test-
specific non-g skills more quickly and adeptly than do those who score lower, and thus 
can utilize test strategies in order to see greater score improvements upon retesting. To 
the extent that higher levels of GMA enable an individual to acquire test-wiseness, 
higher-ability (majority) individuals should exhibit higher retest gains. 
In summary, explanations for differential retest gains for race center on 
underlying ability (at least as captured by typical GMA assessments), explanations for 
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sex center on differences in emotional stability and conscientiousness, and those for 
ability focus on memory and test-wiseness. 
Redemptive versus Non-redemptive Retesting 
Investigations of any individual differences (ability, race, or sex) concerning the 
retest phenomenon are complicated by the fact that the extant literature does not always 
consider the entire range of cognitive ability when retesting. In order to understand who 
retests, and why, the population of re-testers in employment settings can be divided into 
two categories: redemptive, and non-redemptive. Redemptive retesting is characterized 
by individuals who fail an ability test, typically administered in a selection or promotion 
context, and then are given the option to retest. For example, Schleicher et al. (2010) 
examined retest effects using a sample of individuals applying for government positions 
where roughly 15,000 people apply, but applications only occur once a year. As a result, 
several thousand who fail one or more portions of the selection battery are allowed to re-
apply, and thus retest, the next year. 
 Non-redemptive re-testers are individuals who are re-taking an ability test in a 
selection context for a parallel or more advanced job in the same or a different 
organization who did not fail an initial assessment. The practice of re-testing without 
having first failed captures several types of testers. First, those who were previously 
successful in applying for one job, but are either switching jobs or applying for several 
positions at once, and thus retest on one assessment several times. Although this may be 
more difficult to identify because it is cross-organizational, some test publishers keep a 
database of individual test-takers, suggesting that retesting does occur in cross-
organizational situations. For example, Hogan, Barrett, and Hogan (2007) reported that 
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thousands of people taking the Hogan Personality Inventory (R. Hogan & Hogan, 1995) 
had taken the test multiple times over the course of their life. Additionally, non-
redemptive re-testers may be individuals who scored high enough on an online version of 
the test to pass an initial screening, and then are subsequently called in for a second, 
proctored administration of the test. Tippins et al. (2006) presented this two-stage 
selection strategy as an attempt to utilize the advantages of unproctored internet testing 
(e.g., reduced administration costs, increased applicant reach, and enhanced company 
image), while simultaneously reducing their applicant pool to a more manageable number 
and attempting to control for cheating. In other words, the first, online administration of 
the test is used to screen out obvious poor performers, and the follow-up test is 
administered in-person to control for issues of malfeasance accompanying online testing. 
Although there have been no direct investigations into the potential for 
redemptive and non-redemptive re-testers to differ, a handful of studies point to the 
potential for this distinction to be meaningful. With a sample of redemptive re-testers 
who failed on their initial attempt, Lievens and colleagues (2005) found that the validity 
coefficient of an ability test as a predictor of performance (operationalized as GPA) was 
higher for one-time test takers than for either initial or retest scores of re-testers. In other 
words, Lievens et al. (2005) found meaningful differences between people in an 
operational selection context (admission to medical school in Belgium) who passed the 
test on their initial try, and those who initially failed, and then had to retest in order to 
reach the cutoff score even after correcting for the restriction of range in the samples. 
This finding serves as direct support for the argument that there may be meaningful 
differences for different populations of re-testers, especially between typical scenarios 
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where people retest because of an initial failure (redemptive retesting), and those who are 
capable of passing a cutoff score on the first try (non-redemptive retesting). 
Most studies in the current literature, and especially those in operational selection 
contexts focus on the redemptive category of re-testers—those who are re-trying after an 
initial failure (Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 2005; Lievens et al., 2007; Schleicher et al., 
2010; Van Idekkinge et al., 2011; Hausknecht et al., 2007). As a result, most of the 
findings on retest effects in the extant literature are based on samples that do not 
represent the entire applicant pool. Those neglected in this population of re-testers are 
applicants who typically score higher on assessments of GMA who are more likely to be 
non-redemptive re-testers. 
Current Study 
Drawing on the research and arguments presented above, it is known that 
retesting with cognitive ability assessments is a common procedure in selection settings 
and that GMA tests are susceptible to the same score inflation seen in other assessments 
(Hausknecht et al., 2007). It is also known that there are mean group differences by race 
for ability assessments (Hough et al., 2001). Additional research in applied settings 
suggests that race and sex differences exist for different selection methods and 
assessments (Schleicher et al., 2010; Van Iddekinge et al., 2011). However, the majority 
of these findings for retest differences by subgroup were determined in a retest paradigm 
in which the only individuals retesting were those who failed the assessments the first 
time. Thus, it is unclear whether these results are limited by the restricted and incomplete 
sample of redemptive re-testers or those with a potentially lower range of cognitive 
ability. 
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Likewise, although both Schleicher et al. (2010) and Van Iddekinge et al. (2011) 
have made important advancements in the area of retesting using various selection 
measures in operational contexts, these authors reference the prevalence of retest studies 
that deal with cognitively-oriented tests as their rationale for not including typical GMA 
measures in their analyses. However, this literature (e.g., Hausknecht et al.., 2007; Kulik 
et al., 1984;) neglects to evaluate the entire population of re-testers, with a common over-
emphasis on low-ability individuals. More seriously, previous research evaluated ability 
differences in retest performance by sub-categorizing levels of ability and testing for 
group differences (e.g., Rapport et al., 1997) rather than maintaining the continuous 
nature of the data. Thus, a gap in the literature remains to evaluate the potential for 
subgroup and ability differences when re-administering cognitive ability assessments for 
the entire range of ability characterizing the retesting population in a continuous non-
categorical analysis. 
Also lacking in previous research is a direct assessment of the mechanisms which 
might explain subgroup differences in retesting. Fundamentally, race and sex are, in and 
of themselves, not psychologically meaningful variables. Instead, race and sex may serve 
as proxies for differences that could be better explained by underlying psychological 
phenomena that vary across different subgroups: cognitive ability, emotional stability, 
and conscientiousness. However, research studies documenting subgroup and ability 
differences in retest performance as of yet have only speculated concerning what 
mechanisms might explain differences in retest gains without actually measuring and 
testing them. Thus the proxies of race and sex remain, yet an understanding of why 
subgroup identification matters in predicting retest gains is still missing. 
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I redressed these limitations by examining whether retest bias differentially 
impacts protected subgroups and individuals of varying levels of ability on a GMA 
assessment used in employment: the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT). Such an 
investigation is necessary to enhance understanding of assessments of GMA and their re-
administration in selection settings as well as the impact retesting may have on different 
race and sex subgroups which are protected by law during the selection process. The 
current study was conducted in a controlled, low-stakes lab setting where participants 
were not informed of their performance on the initial test or that they would be re-taking 
the same test upon their return in an attempt to control for motivation- and attitude-based 
explanations of retest differences of the phenomenon. 
In addition to assessing the potential for retesting to influence subgroup and 
ability differences on GMA assessments, I also investigated the impact retesting may 
have in a selection setting by instituting a set of reasonable, yet artificial cutoff scores on 
the initial administration of the WPT without notifying participants of the cutoff or the 
results. This artificial division of individuals into initial-pass and initial-fail samples of 
re-testers allows comparison of the two groups to see if the magnitude of retest bias 
differs as a function of cut-off group. 
Situating these purposes into the preceding review of the literature on both 
retesting and adverse impact, I address four very fundamental, yet important sets of 
research questions and hypotheses. First I want to assess whether retesting ameliorates, 
exaggerates, or does not affect race differences upon retesting, and whether GMA is more 
suited to account for these differences than race is. 
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Hypotheses 1a-b: Retesting exaggerates racial differences on the WPT such that 
Whites and Asians improve more upon retesting than Blacks and Hispanics on an 
(1a) identical or (1b) alternate form of the WPT. 
Hypotheses 1c-d: GMA accounts for the racial differences in retest gains, such 
that when the variance attributed to GMA is accounted for, race does not 
contribute any additional variance in retest gains for an (1c) identical or (1d) 
alternate form of the WPT. 
Second, I want to assess whether retesting introduces sex differences on the WPT, with 
the expectation that retesting aids women more than men, but that these differences may 
be more attributable to women’s lower levels of emotional stability and higher levels of 
conscientiousness. 
Hypothesis 2a-b: Women improve more than men when retested with an (2a) 
identical or (2b) alternate form of the WPT. 
Hypotheses 2c-d: Personality differences account for the sex differences in retest 
gains, such that when the variance attributed to emotional stability and 
conscientiousness is accounted for, sex does not contribute any additional 
variance in retest gains for an (2c) identical or (2d) alternate form of the WPT. 
The third area of investigation centers on the potential for individuals with varying levels 
of ability to differ in the degree of score increase they see upon retesting. Specifically, I 
expect that cognitive ability moderates the increase of retest gains such that the higher an 
individual scores on the initial WPT assessment, the greater the rate of change (retest 
gain) between initial and follow-up assessments. 
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Hypothesis 3a-b: Individuals who score higher on the initial WPT assessment see 
greater score gains at Session 2 than those who score lower on their initial 
assessment when retested with an (3a) identical or (3b) alternate form of the 
WPT. 
Finally, I want to know whether there may be differences between re-testers who score 
high enough to initially pass a cutoff score and those who do not. Admittedly, such an 
investigation is limited because the reason for and the decision to retest is inextricably 
tied to retest performance. However, dividing the current sample at several reasonable 
cut-off scores allows preliminary investigation for considering whether redemptive and 
non-redemptive groups may be distinct. 
Hypothesis 4: The magnitude of retest gains is significantly higher for re-testers 
whose initial score on the WPT is high enough to be considered passing than for 
those below the cut-off, with a more stringent cut-off resulting in a larger 
difference. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 243, 67% female, mean age 20.37 [SD = 5.33]) were recruited 
from the campus of a small southern private university and surrounding community 
colleges. The demographics composition of the same was 39.5% White, 30.5% Asian, 
10.5% African-American, and 19.5% Latino/Hispanic. Participants were awarded 
research credit or extra credit for their participation in the study. 
Procedure 
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The entire study was comprised of two sessions separated by a six-week interval 
and is outlined in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Outline of Study Protocol. 
 
At Session 1, participants were administered one form of the Wonderlic Personnel 
Test (WPT), a personality assessment, and a demographics form. After a six-week 
interval, participants returned for Session 2 and were administered an identical and 
alternate form of the WPT. Form A and Form B of the WPT were designed to be 
equivalent in their assessment of GMA. Nevertheless, in order to control for potential 
order or test form effects, participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 
A-AB, A-BA, B-AB, B-BA. Thus, at Session 1 participants were randomly assigned to 
complete either Form A or Form B. Upon their return to the laboratory, all participants 
completed two assessments of the WPT: one of each test form, and were randomly 
assigned such that they either took Form A before Form B, or vice versa. I found no 
evidence of test form or test order effects, thus conditions were collapsed into one group 
and for the remainder of this manuscript I refer to the three WPT with the following 
terminology: Initial, Identical, and Alternate. Initial represents the one test subjects took 
Session 1 
 
Initial WPT 
 
IPIP 
 
Demographics 
Session 2 
 
Identical WPT 
 
Alternate WPT 
6-week 
Delay 
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during Session 1 (regardless of form). Identical represents the assessment taken during 
Session 2 that was the same form of the WPT taken at Session 1 (regardless of form or 
order). And alternate refers to the assessment taken during Session 2 that was not the 
same as the form of the WPT taken at Session 1 (regardless of form or order). 
In order to approximate a retest interval that would more realistically reflect that 
seen in an organization’s selection or promotion process, an interval of six weeks 
between test administrations was implemented. Such an interval is longer than the 
minimum interval suggested by the Wonderlic manual (2002) of at least one half hour 
(established to prevent cognitive fatigue). Other assessments of a similar nature suggest 
similar time-frames (e.g., GRE [60 days], GMAT [31 days]). 
Measures 
Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT). The Wonderlic tests are used in employment 
settings to provide accurate, reliable measures of general cognitive ability (Wonderlic, 
Inc., 2002). The test contains 50 questions with a wide variety of problem types (e.g., 
disarranged sentences, number series, and story problems requiring mathematics or logic 
solutions) which are arranged in order of difficulty with the easiest first. Participants are 
allowed 12 minutes to complete the test. The average score reported in the test manual for 
all job applicants is approximately 21 and is equal to the average score for high school 
graduates; the mean reported in the manual for college graduates is 29 (2002). Meta-
analytic results show the predictive validity of the WPT as .63 in its prediction of ability, 
and .33 in its prediction of college grades (Hunter & Hunter, 1984). Split-half (odd-even) 
reliability of the WPT yielded a correlation of .82 for Form A and .82 for Form B on 
Session 1 scores, and .84 for Form A and .82 for Form B on Session 2 scores. Other 
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estimates of reliability were similarly high, with test-retest reliability for identical forms 
at .86 and alternate form reliability at .83. 
Personality. Participants completed one of the forms (Form A or Form B) of the 
50-item version of the International Personality Item Pool NEO-PI (Goldberg, 1999), a 
Big-5 measure of personality, in order to assess participants’ conscientiousness and 
emotional stability. Participants were provided with statements and asked to rate how 
accurately the statements describe them on a 5-point scale (1 = very inaccurate and 5 = 
very accurate). The scores on the conscientiousness (Form A α = .86; Form B α = .81) 
and emotional stability (Form A α = .87; Form B α = .80) subscales all demonstrated 
adequate levels of reliability. 
Demographics and SAT. Participants completed a demographics form after 
taking the WPT in Session 1 in order to minimize triggering any potentially negative 
stereotypes that may have been induced by asking participants to identify their sex or race 
prior to taking the assessment. Participants were asked to identify their sex as either Male 
or Female, and were provided seven response options for race, including: 
White/Caucasian; Black/African American; Asian; Latino/Hispanic; Native American; 
Middle Eastern; and Other (with a write-in response space provided for Other). 
Participants provided consent for me to contact the University Office for Enrollment in 
order to obtain their official SAT scores. 
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Results 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of all study 
variables. Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations of all study variables by 
subgroup as well as the effect size (Cohen’s d) comparing mean differences by 
subgroups. 
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Table 1 
Intercorrelations, Means, and Standard Deviations of All Study Variables 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. WPT Initial (Session 1) 30.09 7.10 - 
         2. WPT Identical (Session 2) 33.59 7.21 .86 - 
        3. WPT Alternate (Session 2) 32.45 7.18 .83 .85 - 
       4. WPT Retest Difference
a
 - Identical 3.50 3.75 -.23 .29 .07 - 
      5. WPT Retest Difference
a
 - Alternate 2.36 4.17 -.27 .00 .31 .52 - 
     6. SAT Score 1420 113.21 .57 .58 .59 .00 .01 - 
    7. Emotional Stability 3.16 0.72 .00 .02 -.03 .04 -.04 .02 - 
   8. Conscientiousness 3.54 0.67 -.13 -.05 -.08 .14 .08 .09 .10 - 
  9. Quadratic Term 50.15 64.27 -.44 -.48 -.45 -.09 -.02 -.07 .01 .02 - 
 10. Sex 0.67 0.47 -.26 -.26 -.25 -.02 .01 -.14 -.27 .06 .06 - 
11. Age 20.37 5.33 -.39 -.39 -.39 -.01 -.01 -.18 .01 .17 .30 .09 
Note. N = 243 except for SAT N = 199. Sex is dummy-coded so that 0 = male and 1 = female. 
a
Differences were computed so that positive values indicate Session 2 scores were greater than initial 
scores. For all relationships except those with SAT, correlations above .12 or below -.12 are significant, p < .05, two-tailed. For relationships with SAT, correlations above .13 or below -.13 are 
significant, p < .05, two-tailed. 
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Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Mean-group Differences by Subgroup for All Study Variables 
 
Race 
 
Sex 
  White/Asian Black/Hispanic   
 
Male Female   
  M SD M SD d   M SD M SD d 
Sample Size (N)
a
 170 - 72 - - 
 
81 - 162 - - 
Age 19.96 4.87 21.35 6.23 -0.26 
 
19.69 3.56 20.71 6 -0.19 
WPT Time 1 31.78 6.46 26.19 7.03 0.84** 
 
32.67 6.23 28.80 7.17 0.56** 
WPT Time 2 (Identical) 35.32 6.51 29.60 7.25 0.85** 
 
36.28 6.57 32.24 7.16 0.58** 
WPT Time 2 (Alternate) 34.16 6.51 28.50 7.15 0.84** 
 
34.98 6.24 31.19 7.29 0.54** 
WPT Retest Difference
b
 —Identical 3.54 3.83 3.40 3.61 0.04 
 
3.62 3.9 3.44 3.69 0.05 
WPT Retest Difference
b
 —Alternate 2.38 4.22 2.31 4.11 0.02 
 
2.31 3.77 2.39 4.37 -0.02 
SAT Score 1444 103.06 1356 106.54 0.84** 
 
1439.6 110.3 1407.9 113.7 0.28 
Emotional Stability 3.15 0.71 3.20 0.74 -0.06 
 
3.44 0.61 3.02 0.73 0.60** 
Conscientiousness 3.56 0.66 3.49 0.68 0.10   3.49 0.67 3.57 0.67 -0.12 
Note. Mean group differences for each variable (Cohen's d) were computed such that a positive d-score indicates a higher score in favor of the majority (White/Asian and Male). 
a
Sample Size for the SAT variable only was N = 147 (White/Asian), N = 51 (Black/Hispanic), N = 72 (Male), and N = 125 (Female). 
b
Differences were computed so that positive values indicate Session 
2 scores were greater than initial scores. 
**p < .001. *p < .05. 
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Hypotheses evaluating subgroup differences in retest gains (1a-b, 2a-b) were 
assessed with a mixed ANOVA using time (Session 1, Session 2) as the within-subjects 
independent variable and subgroup identification (race and sex) as the between-subjects 
independent variable. WPT scores served as the dependent variable. 
Race Differences in Retest Performance 
Hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1a predicted that Whites and Asians would improve 
more than Blacks and Hispanics when retested with an identical form of the WPT. The 
mixed ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect for race, F(1, 240) = 39.26, p < 
.001, ƞ2 = .14, with means showing that the White-Asian group outperformed the Black-
Hispanic group on the initial WPT assessment (White-Asian M = 31.78, Black-Hispanic 
M = 26.19) and for the identical form at session 2 (White-Asian M = 35.32, Black-
Hispanic M = 29.60). There was also a main effect of session, F(1, 240) = 171.67, p < 
.001, ƞ2 = .42, with means showing that Session 2 scores on an identical form of the WPT 
(M = 33.59) were higher than initial scores (M = 30.09), indicating the presence of a 
retest effect. However, the interaction between race and session was not significant, F(1, 
240) = 0.07, p = .794, ƞ2 = .00, indicating that the magnitude of retest gains on an 
identical form of the WPT did not differ for the two racial subgroups. As there was no 
difference in the rate of improvement by racial subgroup, Hypothesis 1a was not 
supported. 
Hypothesis 1b. Hypothesis 1b predicted that Whites and Asians would improve 
more than Blacks and Hispanics when retested with an alternate form of the WPT. A 
similar mixed ANOVA showed a significant main effect for race, F(1, 240) = 39.83, p < 
.001, ƞ2 = .14, with the White-Asian group outperforming the Black-Hispanic group on 
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the initial WPT assessment (see above) and on the alternate form at Session 2 (White-
Asian M = 34.16, Black-Hispanic M = 28.50). There was a main effect of session, F(1, 
240) = 63.31, p < .001, ƞ2 = .21, with means showing that session 2 scores on an alternate 
form of the WPT (M = 32.45) were higher than initial scores (M = 30.09), indicating the 
presence of a retest effect. However, the interaction between race and session was not 
significant F(1, 240) = 0.02, p = .896, ƞ2 = .00, indicating that the magnitude of retest 
gains on an alternate form of the WPT did not differ for the two racial subgroups. Thus, 
there was no support for Hypothesis 1b, which predicted that retesting on an alternate 
form of the WPT would exaggerate racial differences. 
Hypotheses 1c and 1d were based on the assumption that there would be racial 
differences in retest gains on the WPT (H1a and H1b) and predicted that GMA, as 
approximated by subjects’ SAT scores, would account for more variance in the prediction 
of retest gains than race. Despite the lack of support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I 
conducted hierarchical regression analyses to determine if racial category (White-Asian 
and Black-Hispanic) accounted for additional variance above and beyond initial WPT 
scores, and SAT scores. The dependent variable in this equation was Session 2 scores 
(i.e., retest scores) on the WPT, with the form of the test differing for the two hypotheses 
(1c: identical, 1d: alternate). Table 3 displays the unstandardized regression coefficients 
(B) and their standard error (SE B), the standardized regression coefficients (β), R, R2, 
adjusted R
2
, and the change in R
2
 for each step for the prediction of retest performance on 
an identical form of the WPT (H1c). Table 4 displays the same information for an 
alternate form of the WPT (H1d). 
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Table 3 
Hierarchical Regression of Initial WPT Scores, SAT scores, and Race on Identical-form 
Retest Scores 
Models and variables B SE B β R R2 Adjusted R2 ΔR2 
Step 1 
   
.74 .55 .55 .55* 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .73 .06 .74* 
    Step 2 
   
.76 .58 .58 .04* 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .60 .06 .61* 
       SAT Score .01 .00 .23* 
    Step 3 
   
.77 .59 .58 .00 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .59 .06 .60* 
       SAT Score .01 .00 .21* 
       Race -.79 .60 -.07         
Note. N = 198. Race is dummy-coded so that 0 = White and Asian and 1 = Black and Hispanic. 
*p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis 1c. The DV for Hypothesis 1c was the WPT identical form retest 
score. The IV in step 1 was WPT initial score, R
2
 = .55, F(1, 196) = 236.80, p < .001. 
SAT was added as the second IV in step 2, R
2
 = .58, F(2, 195) = 136.38, p < .001. 
Addition of SAT to the initial WPT scores resulted in a significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 = 
.04, F(1, 195) = 16.83, p < .001, accounting for an additional 4% of the variance in retest 
performance beyond the initial WPT. Racial category (White-Asian and Black-Hispanic) 
was introduced as the third IV in step 3, R
2
 = .59, F(3, 194) = 91.85, p < .001. Addition 
of racial category to the model resulted in a non-significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 = .00, 
F(1, 194) = 1.75, p = .187, explaining no variance in retest performance beyond initial 
WPT scores and SAT. Thus, even after partialing out variance due to initial WPT scores, 
SAT—a measure of GMA distinct from WPT performance—explained significant 
amounts of variance in retest performance on an identical form of the WPT and racial 
category did not. Hypothesis 1c was supported. 
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Table 4 
Hierarchical Regression of Initial WPT Scores, SAT scores, and Race on Alternate-form 
Retest Scores 
Models and variables B SE B β R R2 Adjusted R2 ΔR2 
Step 1 
   
.67 .45 .45 .45* 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .66 .05 .67* 
    Step 2 
   
.72 .51 .51 .06* 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .50 .06 .50* 
       SAT Score .01 .00 .30* 
    Step 3 
   
.72 .52 .51 .00 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .49 .06 .40* 
       SAT Score .01 .00 .23* 
       Race -.61 .65 -.05*         
Note. N = 198. Race is dummy-coded so that 0 = White and Asian and 1 = Black and Hispanic. 
*p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis 1d. The DV for Hypothesis 1c was WPT alternate form retest score. 
The IV in step 1 was WPT initial scores, R
2
 = .45, F(1, 196) = 161.02, p < .001. SAT was 
added as the second IV in step 2, R
2
 = .51, F(2, 195) = 102.52, p < .001. Addition of SAT 
to the initial WPT scores resulted in a significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 = .06, F(1, 195) = 
24.62, p < .001, accounting for 6% of the variance in retest performance. Racial category 
(White-Asian and Black-Hispanic) was introduced as the third IV in step 3, R
2
 = .52, F(3, 
194) = 68.60, p < .001. Addition of racial category to the model resulted in a non-
significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 = .00, F(1, 194) = 0.88, p = .349, explaining no variance 
in retest performance beyond initial WPT scores and SAT. Thus, after partialing out 
variance due to initial WPT scores, SAT scores explained significant amounts of variance 
in retest performance on an alternate form of the WPT and racial category did not. 
Hypothesis 1d was supported. 
Sex Differences in Retest Performance 
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Hypothesis 2a. The second set of hypotheses dealt with sex-based differences in 
retest gains. Hypothesis 2a predicted that women would improve more than men when 
retested with an identical form of the WPT. A mixed ANOVA with session as the within-
subjects independent variable and sex as the between-subjects variable demonstrated a 
significant main effect of sex, F(1,237) = 18.89, p < .001, ƞ2 = .07, with means showing 
that men outperformed women on the initial WPT assessment (Male M = 32.67, Female 
M = 28.80) and on the identical form completed at session 2 (Male M = 36.28, Female M 
= 32.24). The main effect of session demonstrating the presence of a retest effect was 
significant F(1, 240) = 171.67, p < .001, ƞ2 = .42, with session 2 scores on an identical 
form of the WPT (M = 33.59) higher than initial scores (M = 30.09). However, the 
interaction between sex and session was not significant, F(1, 237) = 0.41, p = .525, ƞ2 = 
.00, suggesting that the magnitude of retest gains on an identical form of the WPT did not 
differ by sex. Hypothesis 2a was not supported. 
Hypothesis 2b. Hypothesis 2b predicted that women would improve more than 
men when retested with an alternate form of the WPT. A similar mixed ANOVA showed 
a significant main effect for sex, F(1, 237) = 17.82, p < .001, ƞ2 = .07, with men 
outperforming women on the initial WPT assessment (Male M = 32.67, Female M = 
28.80) and on the alternate form completed at Session 2 (Male M = 34.98, Female M = 
31.19). The main effect of session indicative of retest effects for the alternate form of the 
WPT was significant, F(1, 240) = 63.31, p < .001, ƞ2 = .21, with means showing that 
session 2 scores on an alternate form of the WPT (M = 32.45) were higher than initial 
scores (M = 30.09)). The interaction between sex and session was not significant, F(1, 
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237) = 0.00, p = .959, ƞ2 = .00, suggesting that the magnitude of retest gains on an 
alternate form of the WPT did not differ by sex. Hypothesis 2b was not supported. 
Hypotheses 2c and 2d were based on the assumption that there would be sex 
differences in retest gains on the WPT (H2a and H2b) and predicted that emotional 
stability and conscientiousness would account for more variability in the prediction of 
retest gains than the proxy of sex would. Despite the lack of support for Hypotheses 2a 
and 2b, I conducted hierarchical regression analyses to determine if sex accounted for 
additional variance above and beyond initial WPT scores, and personality variables 
(emotional stability and conscientiousness). The dependent variable in this model was 
Session 2 scores (i.e., retest scores) on the WPT, with the form of the test differing for the 
two hypotheses (2c: identical, 2d: alternate). Table 5 displays the unstandardized 
regression coefficients (B) and their standard error (SE B), the standardized regression 
coefficients (β), R, R2, adjusted R2, and the change in R2 for each step for the prediction 
of retest performance on an identical form of the WPT (H2c). Table 6 displays the same 
information for an alternate form of the WPT (H2d). 
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Table 5 
Hierarchical Regression of Initial WPT Scores, Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness, 
and Sex on Identical-form Retest Scores 
Models and variables B SE B β R R2 Adjusted R2 ΔR2 
Step 1 
   
.86 .74 .74 .74* 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .88 .03 .86* 
    Step 2 
   
.86 .74 .74 .00 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .88 .03 .86* 
       Emotional Stability .21 .33 .02 
    Step 3 
   
.86 .75 .74 .00 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .88 .03 .87* 
       Emotional Stability .16 .33 .02 
       Conscientiousness .59 .36 .06 
    Step 4 
   
.87 .75 .75 .00 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .87 .03 .86* 
       Emotional Stability .03 .34 .00 
       Conscientiousness .62 .36 .06 
       Sex -.71 .54 -.05         
Note. N = 243. Sex is dummy-coded so that 0 = Male and 1 = Female. 
*p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis 2c. The DV for hypothesis 2c was WPT Identical form retest scores. 
The IV in step 1 was WPT initial score. This step accounted for 74% of the variance in 
retest performance, R
2 
= .74, F(1, 241) = 699.82, p < .001. Emotional stability was added 
as the second IV in step 2, R
2 
= .74, F(2, 240) = 349.26, p < .001. Addition of emotional 
stability to the initial WPT scores did not result in a significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 = 
.00, F(1, 240) = 0.41, p = .524, accounting for no variance in retest performance beyond 
initial WPT scores. Conscientiousness was introduced as the third IV in step 3, R
2 
= .75, 
F(3, 239) = 235.47, p < .001. Addition of conscientiousness to the equation with 
emotional stability also did not result in a significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 = .00, F(1, 
239) = 2.76, p = .098, and accounted for none of the variance in retest performance 
beyond initial WPT scores and emotional stability. Sex was introduced as the fourth IV in 
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step 4, R
2 
= .75, F(4, 238) = 177.59, p < .001. Addition of sex to the model resulted in a 
non-significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 = .00, F(1, 238) = 1.75, p = .187, explaining no 
variance in retest performance beyond initial WPT scores, emotional stability, and 
conscientiousness. This pattern of results suggests that none of the hypothesized 
predictors: emotional stability, conscientiousness, or sex predicted variability in retest 
performance on an identical form of the WPT beyond the initial WPT scores. Thus, 
hypothesis 2c was not supported. 
 
Table 6 
Hierarchical Regression of Initial WPT Scores, Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness, 
and Sex on Alternate-form Retest Scores 
Models and variables B SE B β R R2 Adjusted R2 ΔR2 
Step 1 
   
.83 .69 .69 .69* 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .84 .04 .83* 
    Step 2 
   
.83 .69 .69 .00 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .84 .04 .83* 
       Emotional Stability -.26 .36 -.03 
    Step 3 
   
.83 .69 .69 .00 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .84 .04 .83* 
       Emotional Stability -.29 .36 -.03 
       Conscientiousness .30 .39 .03 
    Step 4 
   
.83 .69 .69 .00 
   WPT Initial (Session 1) .83 .04 .82* 
       Emotional Stability -.43 .38 -.04 
       Conscientiousness .33 .39 .03 
       Sex -.79 .59 -.05         
Note. N = 243. Sex is dummy-coded so that 0 = Male and 1 = Female. 
*p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis 2d. The DV for hypothesis 2d was WPT alternate form retest scores. 
The IV in step 1 was WPT initial score. This step accounted for 69% of the variance in 
retest performance, R
2 
= .69, F(1, 241) = 529.92, p < .001. Emotional stability was added 
as the second IV in step 2, R
2 
= .69, F(2, 240) = 264.70, p < .001. Addition of emotional 
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stability to predict retest performance did not result in a significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 
= .00, F(1, 240) = 0.52, p = .470, accounting for no variance in retest performance 
beyond initial WPT scores. Conscientiousness was introduced as the third IV in step 3, R
2
 
= .69, F(3, 239) = 176.35, p < .001. Addition of conscientiousness to the equation with 
emotional stability did not result in a significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 = .00, F(1, 239) = 
0.58, p = .446, and accounted for none of the variance in retest performance beyond 
initial WPT scores and emotional stability. Sex was introduced as the fourth IV in step 4,  
R
2 
= .69, F(4, 238) = 133.15, p < .001. Addition of sex to the equation with emotional 
stability and conscientiousness resulted in a non-significant increment in R
2, ΔR2 = .00, 
F(1, 238) = 1.79, p = .183, explaining no variance in retest performance beyond initial 
WPT scores, emotional stability, and conscientiousness. This pattern of results suggests 
that none of the hypothesized predictors: emotional stability, conscientiousness, or sex 
predicted variability in retest performance on an alternate form of the WPT. Hypothesis 
2d was not supported. 
Ability Differences in Retest Performance 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that individuals higher in cognitive ability would exhibit 
larger score gains than those with lower ability when retested with an identical (3a) or 
alternate (3b) form of the WPT. Hierarchical regression was employed to determine if the 
addition of a curvilinear term for initial scores improved prediction of retest scores on the 
WPT beyond that afforded by the linear prediction of retest scores alone. The first IV in 
these equations was individuals’ initial scores on the WPT, and the second IV was the 
squared product of initial scores on the WPT (quadratic term), with the DV depending on 
the test form of the Session 2 scores (identical: 3a, alternate: 3b). Table 7 displays the 
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unstandardized regression coefficients (B) and their standard error (SE B), the 
standardized regression coefficients (β), R, R2, adjusted R2, and the change in R2 for each 
step for the prediction of retest performance on an identical form of the WPT (H3a). 
Table 8 displays the same for an alternate form of the WPT (H3b). 
Table 7 
Hierarchical Regression of the Linear and Quadratic Terms of Initial WPT Scores on 
Identical-form Retest Scores 
Models and variables B SE B β R R2 Adjusted R2 ΔR2 
Step 1 
   
.86 .74 .74 .74* 
   WPT Initial (Session 1)  
   Linear Term .88 .03 .86* 
    Step 2 
   
.87 .76 .75 .01* 
   WPT Initial (Session 1)  
   Linear Term .82 .04 .81* 
       WPT Initial (Session 1)  
   Quadratic Term -.01 .00 -.12*         
Note. N = 243. 
*p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis 3a. The DV for hypothesis 3a was WPT identical form retest scores. 
The IV in step 1 was WPT initial score, R
2
 = .74, F(1, 241) = 699.82, p < .001. The 
quadratic term for initial WPT scores was added as the second IV in step 2, R
2
 = .76, F(2, 
240) = 372.08, p < .001. Addition of the quadratic term for initial scores to the initial 
scores resulted in a significant increment in R
2
, ΔR2 = .01, F(1, 240) = 12.10, p = .001, 
accounting for 1% of additional variance in retest scores beyond the linear term. The 
adjusted R
2
 value of .75 of the full model indicates that roughly three-quarters of the 
variability in retest scores on an identical form of the WPT is predicted by the linear and 
quadratic functions of initial scores. 
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Table 8 
Hierarchical Regression of the Linear and Quadratic Terms of Initial WPT Scores on 
Alternate-form Retest Scores 
Models and variables B SE B β R R2 Adjusted R2 ΔR2 
Step 1 
   
.83 .69 .69 .69** 
   WPT Initial (Session 1)  
   Linear Term .84 .04 .83** 
    Step 2 
   
.83 .70 .69 .01* 
   WPT Initial (Session 1)  
   Linear Term .79 .04 .78** 
       WPT Initial (Session 1)  
   Quadratic Term -.01 .00 -.10*         
Note. N = 243. 
*p < .05, **p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. The DV for Hypothesis 3b was WPT alternate form retest scores. 
The IV in step 1 was WPT initial score, R
2
 = .69, F(1, 241) = 529.92, p < .001. The 
quadratic term for initial WPT scores was added as the second IV in step 2, R
2
 = .70, F(2, 
240) = 274.71, p < .001. Addition of the quadratic term for initial scores to the equation 
with initial scores resulted in a significant increment in R
2
, ΔR2 = .01, F(1, 240) = 6.79, p 
= .010, accounting for 1% of additional variance in retest scores beyond the linear term. 
The adjusted R
2
 value of .69 of the full model indicates that just under three-quarters of 
the variability in retest scores on an alternate form of the WPT is predicted by the linear 
and quadratic functions of initial scores. 
However, evidence of a quadratic trend alone does not answer the question 
whether higher- or lower-ability demonstrated a greater rate of increase between initial 
and retest scores: the direction of the trend is also important. Figure 2 displays the 
quadratic trend found in the prediction of retest scores on an identical form of the WPT, 
and Figure 3 displays the same trend for an alternate form of the WPT. 
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Figure 2. Prediction of Retest Performance on an Identical Form of the WPT by Linear 
and Quadratic Functions of Session 1 Scores. 
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Figure 3. Prediction of Retest Performance on an Alternate Form of the WPT by Linear 
and Quadratic Functions of Session 1 Scores. 
 
The trend is in fact a decelerating curve, rather than accelerating, and in 
comparison to the linear trend in the quadratic line predicts that people between roughly 
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1) would gain more on the retest administration than the linear trend predicts. Thus, the 
retest scores for those below about the 25
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 percentile and above the 75
th
 percentile (i.e., 
below 21 and above 36 on the WPT at Session 1) are overestimated with the linear trend. 
This observation holds for both identical and alternate forms of the WPT (see Figure 2 
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ability) actually improved less when retested than did those in the mid-ability range 
whether retest occurred with an identical or alternate form of the WPT. 
Artificial Cut-off Score Analyses 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that individuals who met or exceeded a predetermined cut-
off level on their initial WPT assessment would gain more from retesting than would 
those who scored below the cut-off level. I considered three different cut-offs to assess 
this prediction. Tables 9, 10, and 11 present all relevant statistics for these data by Cut-off 
Score 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Figures 4, 5, and 6 also present the mean performance of 
the “pass” and “fail” groups on all WPT assessments for Cut-off Score 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. 
Table 9 
Sample Size, Means, Standard Deviations and Mean-group Differences by Cut-off Score 
1: A Score of 29 on the Initial WPT 
 
“Pass” “Fail”   
  N M SD N M SD d 
WPT Initial (Session 1) 158 34.42 3.54 85 22.02 4.52 3.17** 
WPT Identical (Session 2) 158 37.63 3.91 85 26.07 5.77 2.49** 
WPT Alternate (Session 2) 158 36.30 4.27 85 25.29 5.88 2.25** 
WPT Retest Difference
a
 —
Identical 
158 3.21 3.72 85 4.05 3.77 -0.22 
WPT Retest Difference
a
 —
Alternate 
158 1.87 4.16 85 3.27 4.07 -0.34* 
Note. d-scores were calculated such that a positive value indicates an advantage for the “Pass” group. 
a
Retest differences were computed so that positive values indicate Session 2 scores were greater than Session 1 scores. 
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Figure 4. Mean Group Differences on the Three WPT Assessments for Cut-off Score 1: 
29 on the Initial WPT. “Fail” represents those below the cut-off: n = 85. “Pass” 
represents those exceeding the cut-off: n = 158. Error bars represent the 95% confidence 
interval around the mean. 
 
Cut-off Score 1. The first artificial cut-off was set at a score of 29 (the mean 
score for college graduates reported in the WPT manual) on the initial WPT assessment. 
158 participants exceeded this cut-off level (M = 34.42) and 85 did not (M = 22.02). 
Those who exceeded cut-off level 1 gained an average of 3.21 points when retested with 
an identical form of the WPT and those below the cut-off gained an average of 4.05 
points. However, as indicated by the failure to find an interaction between the two 
groups’ retest scores on the identical form of the WPT, F(1, 241) = 2.78, p = .097, d = -
0.22, these differences were not significant (a negative d-score indicates that those below 
the cut-off gained more by retesting than those above the cut-off). In contrast, for the 
alternate form retest, those exceeding the cut-off at Session 1 gained 1.87 points and 
those below the cut-off gained 3.27 points which was a significant, albeit relatively small 
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difference, F(1, 241) = 6.33, p = .013, d = -0.34, demonstrating that those below the cut-
off gained more from retesting with an alternate form. 
Table 10 
Sample Size, Means, Standard Deviations and Mean-group Differences by Cut-off Score 
2: The 70
th
 Percentile on the Initial WPT 
 
“Pass” “Fail”   
  N M SD N M SD d 
WPT Initial (Session 1) 75 37.52 2.27 168 26.77 5.90 2.12** 
WPT Identical (Session 2) 75 39.44 3.11 168 30.98 6.99 1.39** 
WPT Alternate (Session 2) 75 37.79 3.87 168 30.07 7.03 1.24** 
WPT Retest Difference
a
 —
Identical 
75 1.92 3.34 168 4.21 3.72 -0.63** 
WPT Retest Difference
a
 —
Alternate 
75 0.27 3.36 168 3.30 4.17 -0.77** 
Note. d-scores were calculated such that a positive value indicates an advantage for the “Pass” group. 
a
Retest differences were computed so that positive values indicate Session 2 scores were greater than Session 1 scores. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean Group Differences on the Three WPT Assessments for Cut-off Score 2: 
70
th
 Percentile on the Initial WPT. “Fail” represents those below the cut-off: n = 168. 
“Pass” represents those exceeding the cut-off: n = 75. Error bars represent the 95% 
confidence interval around the mean. 
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Cut-off Score 2. The second artificial cut-off was set at the 70
th
 percentile for 
performance on the initial WPT assessment, meaning that only 30% of participants were 
in the pass group. This cut-off resulted in 75 individuals above the cut-off (M = 37.52) 
and 168 individuals below the cut-off (M = 26.77). Those scoring above the cut-off at 
Session 1 gained an average of 1.92 points when retested with an identical form of the 
WPT and those below the cut-off gained 4.21 points. The difference was significant, F(1, 
241) = 20.84, p < .001, d = -0.63, providing evidence that those below the 70
th
 percentile 
cut-off gained more from retesting than did those above the cut-off. Individuals above the 
cut-off also gained less (M = 0.27) when retested with an alternate form than those below 
the cut-off (M = 3.30) which was also a large and significant effect, F(1, 241) = 30.71, p 
< .001, d = -0.77. 
Table 11 
Sample Size, Means, Standard Deviations and Mean-group Differences by Cut-off Score 
3: The Top 40 Scorers on the Initial WPT 
 
“Pass” “Fail”   
  N M SD N M SD d 
WPT Initial (Session 1) 43 39.07 1.78 200 28.16 6.28 1.90** 
WPT Identical (Session 2) 43 39.81 3.3 200 32.25 7.13 1.14** 
WPT Alternate (Session 2) 43 38.86 3.80 200 31.07 6.98 1.19** 
WPT Retest Difference
a
 —
Identical 43 0.74 3.21 200 4.10 3.60 -0.95** 
WPT Retest Difference
a
 —
Alternate 43 -0.21 3.26 200 2.92 4.15 -0.78** 
Note. d-scores were calculated such that a positive value indicates an advantage for the “Pass” group. 
a
Retest differences were computed so that positive values indicate Session 2 scores were greater than Session 1 scores. 
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Figure 6. Mean Group Differences on the Three WPT Assessments for Cut-off Score 3: 
Top 40 Highest Scorers on the Initial WPT. “Fail” represents those below the cut-off: n = 
200. “Pass” represents those exceeding the cut-off: n = 43. Error bars represent the 95% 
confidence interval around the mean. 
 
Cut-off Score 3. The third and final artificial cut-off was a top-down selection 
approach where the top 40 scorers on the initial WPT assessment were classified as 
passing and all else were classified as failed. Due to scores being tied, 43 individuals 
were actually included in the pass group (M = 39.07) and 200 were in the fail group (M = 
28.16). Those individuals in the pass group gained an average of 0.74 points when 
retested with an identical form of the WPT and those in the fail group gained an average 
of 4.10 points. The difference was significant and large, F(1, 241) = 31.78, p < .001, d = -
0.95, suggesting those in the pass group gained less from retesting with an identical form 
than those in the fail group did. Similarly, the top group actually decreased their score by 
an average of 0.21 when retested with an alternate form of the WPT and those in the fail 
group gained an average of 2.92 points, F(1, 241) = 21.52, p < .001, d = -0.78. Thus, 
when the top 43 individuals were compared with the bottom 200, those in the bottom 
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group saw larger retest score increases on an alternate form of the WPT than those in the 
pass group. 
Discussion 
The primary objective of this study was to investigate the extent to which the 
practice of retesting disadvantages individuals based on race, sex, and ability-level. 
Additionally, I considered several mechanisms which might explain these differences. To 
further extend the investigation of ability-differences to a workplace setting, this study 
also considered how those passing or failing several artificial cut-offs differed in their 
retest performance. 
Race and Sex Differences in Retest Performance 
Although there was clear evidence of score gains when retaking both identical 
(t[242] = 14.54, dependent-d = 0.49) and alternate (t[242] = 8.82, dependent-d = 0.33) 
forms of the WPT, the results failed to provide any evidence that retesting advantaged or 
disadvantaged individuals based on their race or sex (see Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & 
Burke, 1996, Equation 3, for the calculation of dependent d-scores). When retested, 
Blacks and Hispanics raised their scores on identical and alternate forms of the WPT as 
much as Whites and Asians: identical d = 0.04, alternate d = 0.02 (d-scores represent 
Session 2 performance – Session 1 performance, see Table 2). Males also gained as much 
as females when retested on identical and alternate forms of the WPT: identical d = 0.05, 
alternate d = -0.02. In line with previous research (Roth et al., 2001), I found evidence of 
mean differences by race on the initial WPT assessment in favor of the White/Asian 
racial subgroup (d = 0.84). In contrast to previous research (Neisser et al., 1996), I also 
found evidence of mean sex differences on the WPT in favor of Males (d = 0.56). 
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Nevertheless, the magnitude of these differences favoring Males and the White/Asian 
group remained unchanged at the retest administration: sex d = 0.55, race d = 0.84. Thus, 
failure to find race and sex differences in retest gains was not due to the absence of race 
and sex differences in test performance. Contrasted with evidence that race and sex 
differences in retest improvement exist for different selection tests and methods 
(Schleicher et al., 2010; Van Iddekinge et al., 2011), these null findings for subgroup 
differences on GMA retest performance should be comforting for organizations utilizing 
re-testing policies for ability assessments in the sense that retesting might not contribute 
to adverse impact beyond mean group differences on the test itself. 
Underlying Mechanisms for Differences in Retest Performance 
Corroborating the idea that retest differences do not depend on race and sex 
identification, only one of the three hypothesized mechanisms to explain differences in 
retest performance accounted for variance in retest gains. SAT scores predicted a 
significant amount of variance in retest performance on both an identical (ΔR2 = .04, β = 
.21, p < .001) and alternate (ΔR2 = .06, β = .29, p < .001) form of the WPT. The beta-
weights are relatively large for the prediction of retest performance, especially given that 
initial scores on the WPT were included as the first step in the regression model. The 
positive direction of the beta weights indicates that SAT scores positively predict scores 
on the WPT at a retest administration, suggesting that high-scorers on the SAT also 
performed well when retested on the WPT. The finding that SAT scores can predict retest 
performance on an identical or alternate form of the WPT after partialing out initial WPT 
scores reinforces the idea that there is variance unaccounted for in retest scores that is not 
predicted by initial test performance, and that this variance can be explained by 
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individual differences. This is true even when the initial and additional predictors are 
assessments of the same construct. Thus, perhaps SAT scores capture components of 
ability or motivation that are not assessed by the WPT (which is itself a well-established 
test of cognitive ability, Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Wonderlic Inc., 2002), and display the 
importance of these unique aspects above those captured by any one assessment’s 
measure of ability. 
Similar to the inability of race and sex to predict retest scores, emotional stability 
and conscientiousness also did not contribute to the prediction of retest scores for either 
identical or alternate forms of the WPT. Failure to find effects may explain why the role 
of individual differences and especially non-ability differences in retest settings is largely 
ignored in the selection and testing literature (e.g., Reeve & Lam, 2007 is one noteworthy 
exception). This study highlights the difficulty in finding evidence for theoretically 
relevant individual differences (e.g., conscientiousness and emotional stability) to predict 
retest performance, while simultaneously highlighting the need for researchers to account 
for other individual differences (e.g., GMA). Moreover, it is still possible that personality 
variables will exert more of an influence in a more high-stakes setting or one in which 
feedback concerning test performance is provided: issues which shall be addressed in the 
limitations section. 
Ability Differences in Retest Performance 
The next part of this investigation tested whether individuals with higher ability-
levels would gain more from retesting than those with lower ability. A curvilinear 
regression analysis was conducted to consider whether individuals who score higher on 
the initial WPT gain exponentially more when retested than those who score lower 
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initially. Although there was evidence of a curvilinear relationship in retest performance, 
contrary to my hypothesis the curve was decelerated, suggesting that moderate-ability 
individuals gain more from retesting than do either low- or high-ability individuals. A 
close examination of Figures 2 and 3, which displays the fit of the linear and quadratic 
function of Session 1 scores in the prediction of Session 2 scores on identical and 
alternate forms of the WPT (respectively) illustrates that people between roughly the 25
th
 
and 75
th
 percentile (i.e., those scoring between 21 and 36 on the WPT at Session 1) would 
gain more on the retest administration than the linear trend predicts. Alternatively, retest 
scores for those below the 25
th
 percentile and above the 75
th
 percentile (i.e., below 21 and 
above 36 on the WPT at Session 1) are overestimated with the simple linear regression 
line. Thus, the evidence suggests that regardless of test form (i.e., identical or alternate) 
individuals on both ends of the ability continuum (very high- and very low-ability) 
improved less when retested than did those in the mid-ability range. 
This finding challenges earlier investigations which categorized individuals into 
varying levels of ability and found that higher-ability individuals obtained larger score 
gains when retested (Kulik et al., 1984; Rapport et al., 1997). However, curvilinear 
regression analysis allows for a more nuanced test of ability-related differences in retest 
performance as it maintains the continuous nature of the data. Thus, the current findings 
extend previous research by making important qualifications suggesting that “the rich” 
(i.e., those high in GMA) may not always “get richer,” but the middle-class might 
(Rapport et al., 375). This evidence, coupled with the large sample size (current study: N 
= 243, Rapport et al., 1997: N = 36) also lends more confidence to these results than 
those of earlier investigations. This finding suggests that average-scoring test-takers with 
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the option to retest may obtain larger score improvements than both relatively low-
scoring and relatively high-scoring testers. Thus, it seems that those individuals within 
the interquartile range of the ability distribution may be the most successful at improving 
their score on a GMA assessment when they are retested relative to those in the lower 
quartile who may lack the ability to find ways to increase their score and to those in the 
upper quartile who may lack the room (in terms of the test scale) to increase.  
There are several possible reasons that could explain why average-ability 
individuals may improve more than lower- and higher-ability individuals on GMA 
assessments. I will present two possible explanations for the under-improvement of high- 
and low-ability individuals. First, in accordance with Kanfer and Ackerman’s (1989) 
resource allocation model, it may be that individuals with moderate levels of ability 
might have spent more of their Session 1 assessment in an earlier phase of skill 
acquisition requiring more cognitive effort due to inefficiencies in directing their 
attentional resources (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Thus, preoccupation with 
understanding and following the test instructions and format, acquiring WPT-specific 
skills, or attending to the time limit or any test-irrelevant stimuli could have drawn away 
the more limited resources of these average-ability individuals, resulting in a lower score. 
In contrast, the highest-ability individuals may have more quickly acquired the test-
specific skills (e.g., test-wiseness) and reached their plateau during Session 1 such that 
their retest performance remained relatively stable. On the other hand, low-ability 
individuals may have been so distracted or inefficient at skill acquisition and self-
regulation during Session 1 to have not benefitted much from this initial assessment. 
Thus, by providing an opportunity to retest, average-ability individuals may have moved 
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past the more cognitively-taxing phase of skill acquisition after acquiring and executing 
any WPT-specific skills in order to better allocate their resources to test performance, 
resulting in higher scores. Future research should investigate these and other explanations 
for retest gains as moderated by ability-level in order to better understand this effect. 
Second, an alternative explanation is that there could simply be a ceiling effect, 
such that individuals who scored higher on the WPT at Session 1 may not have much 
more room to improve before reaching the maximum score, whereas those who scored 
lower have much more room to improve. Although there was no evidence of a ceiling 
effect in the present study (WPT maximum score is 50 and the highest score obtained at 
Session 1 was 43 and at Session 2 was 46), there could still have been a partial ceiling 
effect. Nonetheless, this explanation is deficient in that it only explains the smaller retest 
score increases for people with higher levels of GMA, not those with lower levels. 
Cut-off Scores and Retesting 
The final goal was to demonstrate the consequences that retest effects may have 
on a common selection procedure: discrimination of test-takers on the basis of cut-off 
scores (Dwyer, 1996). In accordance with the ability-related differences in retest gains 
which challenged my predictions and the existing literature (Kulik et al., 1984; Rapport et 
al., 1997), analyses comparing retest gains for individuals above and below artificial cut-
off levels on Session 1 scores support the idea that lower-scoring individuals gain more 
from retesting than do higher-scoring individuals. The first cut-off, a score of 29 on the 
WPT, was based on the mean reported score in the WPT manual for college graduates 
(Wonderlic, Inc., 2002) which was lower than the mean in this sample (M = 30.09, SD = 
7.10) and thus resulted in a larger pass group (i.e., above the cut-off; N = 158) than fail 
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group (i.e., those below the cut-off; N = 85). At this cut-off there were no significant 
differences in retest gains between the groups on the identical form of the WPT (d = -
0.22), however, there was a small advantage for those below the cut-off when retested on 
an alternate form of the WPT (d = -0.34; a negative d-score indicates that those below the 
cut-off gained more by retesting than those above the cut-off). When the cut-off was 
more stringent and set at the 70
th
 percentile (i.e., the top 30
th
 percentile passed), those 
above the cut-off level (N = 75) did not gain as much from retesting with an identical (d = 
-0.63) or alternate (d = -0.77) form of the WPT as those below the cut-off level (N = 
168). These large, significant differences were even more pronounced for the final cut-off 
simulation where the top-scoring 43 individuals were selected to be in the pass group and 
the bottom-scoring 200 were in the fail group. Those above this cut-off were severely 
disadvantaged, gaining much less on identical (d = -0.95) and alternate (d = -0.78) forms 
of the WPT at retest administrations compared to the fail group. 
Taken together, the pattern of cut-off score analyses suggests that individuals 
below cut-off levels may obtain larger score increases relative to individuals who exceed 
the cut-off level. Thus, to the extent that there are no other restraints or repercussions for 
retesting, it seems that lower-ability individuals who may have failed to meet a 
predetermined cut-off score have little to lose and much to gain when they re-take an 
assessment. An additional implication of the differences between the retest gains of those 
above and below these cut-off scores, and one reinforced by other analyses in this paper 
is that the retest phenomenon is not functionally equivalent across all levels of ability. 
Thus, it may be that the over-emphasis in the current literature on low-ability individuals, 
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or those more likely to be in a redemptive retesting situation (based on ability alone), 
prevents a comprehensive understanding of retest effects. 
Limitations & Future Directions 
There are several reasons why race and sex—the focal interest of the current 
study—may not have contributed to the explanation of variance in retest gains. One 
explanation could be the lack of variance due to the high correlations between the Session 
1 and Session 2 scores on the WPT (Identical r = .86, Alternate r = .83). Nonetheless, the 
finding that SAT scores (which might be considered a less robust measure of cognitive 
ability compared to the WPT), predict retest performance on the WPT beyond initial 
scores provides evidence that there is enough variance in the pool of retest gains 
unaccounted for by initial scores to be predicted by other variables. 
Additional limitations include characteristics of this study’s testing conditions and 
the lack of feedback which typically drives the need for retesting in the first place. As this 
study was conducted in a lab where individuals were rewarded for merely completing the 
assessments, motivation to perform well on the assessment may have been less intense 
than motivation to perform well at initial or retest sessions in a high-stakes settings where 
important rewards depend on successful test performance (Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, & 
Martin, 1990). Moreover, all participants in this study were required to retest, so the 
choice to retest and the reasons underlying that choice were not represented in this 
paradigm, though they are certainly important to consider (Lievens et al., 2005; Messick 
& Jungeblut, 1981). Beyond direct influences of increased motivation on retest 
performance, higher stakes and higher motivation levels are likely to encourage 
individuals to seek out various forms of test-coaching to help prepare them for follow-up 
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assessments (Hausknecht et al., 2007; Messick & Jungeblut, 1981). In contrast, 
participants in this study were not provided feedback concerning their performance on the 
initial WPT assessment and also were not informed that they would be re-taking the 
assessment at their follow-up session. Thus, issues of redemptive versus non-redemptive 
retesting could not be accurately simulated in the current study as participants were 
unaware whether they exceeded a self- or other-set cut-off at their initial test session. 
Taking all of these limitations into consideration, it is safe to say that the findings 
provided here are likely lower-bound estimates of retest effects and differences. 
Yet, despite the limitations of the current study, there are also a number of 
benefits to the approach taken. First, I was able to sample a wider range of ability as 
opposed to a restricted sample based on initial test performance (i.e., everyone in the 
sample retested). Second, the removal of explicit feedback and selection or reward 
decisions based on test performance was intended to minimize salient characteristics of 
motivation and attitudes in order to focus more directly on the goals of the current study: 
ability- and personality-based explanations of retest performance. Nevertheless, future 
research is needed to address retesting in a high-stakes setting, to evaluate the effects of 
test-taker motivation and test-taking attitudes, and to evaluate the effects of volition and 
reward. Even in a laboratory setting, valuable future research could be conducted on the 
effects of motivation on retest performance as variables such as initial performance 
feedback, opportunity to retest, and reward can be manipulated. 
Finally, the failure to find differences for legally protected subgroups is itself 
evidence that race and sex differences in retest gains on ability assessments may not be 
particularly problematic. Instead, these findings may lend confidence to the utilization of 
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retesting in selection systems because the practice of retesting itself does not introduce or 
exaggerate subgroup differences. Moreover, individuals who are anxious that retest 
opportunities on GMA assessments will be disadvantageous to them because of their 
minority status, lower levels of emotional stability, or lower conscientiousness should be 
reassured that the practice of retesting alone does not exaggerate any subgroup 
differences—though it does preserve them. These implications are, of course, tempered 
by the fact that I only have retest data for one assessment of GMA. Future research 
should test for subgroup differences on various GMA assessments and should also 
examine mechanisms which might theoretically explain why certain subgroups would 
benefit from retesting more than others. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the potential for score gains due to 
retesting on the WPT to differ depending on individuals’ protected class (race and sex) 
and ability level, and to test what these findings might mean in a selection context. I 
found no evidence that retest gains are moderated by race or sex, implying that 
organizations may not be placing themselves at risk of manipulating subgroup differences 
on GMA test performance merely by asking employees or applicants to complete a 
follow-up assessment. There was also no indication that individuals’ emotional stability 
or conscientiousness contributed to retest performance. However, SAT scores predicted 
variance in retest scores after controlling for initial test performance, suggesting that 
alternate GMA assessments besides the one used for retesting can explain variability in 
retest performance. Thus, the warning that retest performance might differ by race 
remains in effect as there remain mean group differences by race on the SAT, WPT, and 
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virtually all GMA assessments (Roth et al., 2001). There was also evidence of a 
curvilinear component in the prediction of retest scores, suggesting that individuals with 
moderate initial scores (i.e., within the interquartile range) on the WPT gain more from 
retesting than those with either low (i.e., lower quartile) or higher (i.e., upper quartile) 
initial scores. Furthermore, the establishment of artificial cut-off levels based on Session 
1 scores demonstrated that those below the cut-off gained more when retested than those 
above the cut-off. Therefore, it may be most beneficial to encourage average-scorers and 
in some cases lower-scorers who may have failed to meet an important selection cut-off 
level to re-test as they have little to lose and much to gain when re-taking an ability 
assessment.  
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